Cyber Security Modeling of Non-Critical Nuclear Power Plant Digital Instrumentation - Critical Infrastructure Protection XIII Access content directly
Conference Papers Year : 2019

Cyber Security Modeling of Non-Critical Nuclear Power Plant Digital Instrumentation

Abstract

This chapter examines potential attack vectors that exist in a nuclear power plant and correlates the likelihood of an attack from each vector. The focus is on the boron monitoring system, which directly affects the reactivity in the core; cyber attacks on this system can lead to increased core wear, unsafe reactivity levels and poor power performance. A mockup model is developed using open-source software and hardware, which is tested to evaluate the potential of cyber attacks. A man-in-the-middle attack is implemented to demonstrate a cyber attack and its potential effects. Additionally, a redundancy-based cyber attack mitigation method is implemented using a hardware device that compares the input/output values of multiple programmable logic controllers. The approach for modeling general attack and defense steps is applicable to industrial control systems in the energy sector.
Fichier principal
Vignette du fichier
491841_1_En_5_Chapter.pdf (533.44 Ko) Télécharger le fichier
Origin : Files produced by the author(s)

Dates and versions

hal-03364576 , version 1 (04-10-2021)

Licence

Attribution

Identifiers

Cite

Trevor Maclean, Robert Borrelli, Michael Haney. Cyber Security Modeling of Non-Critical Nuclear Power Plant Digital Instrumentation. 13th International Conference on Critical Infrastructure Protection (ICCIP), Mar 2019, Arlington, VA, United States. pp.87-100, ⟨10.1007/978-3-030-34647-8_5⟩. ⟨hal-03364576⟩
64 View
47 Download

Altmetric

Share

Gmail Facebook X LinkedIn More