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Conference Papers Year : 2014

An Information Flow Monitor-Inlining Compiler for Securing a Core of JavaScript

Abstract

Web application designers and users alike are interested in isolation properties for trusted JavaScript code in order to prevent confi-dential resources from being leaked to untrusted parties. Noninterference provides the mathematical foundation for reasoning precisely about the information flows that take place during the execution of a program. Due to the dynamicity of the language, research on mechanisms for enforcing noninterference in JavaScript has mostly focused on dynamic approaches. We present the first information flow monitor inlining compiler for a re-alistic core of JavaScript. We prove that the proposed compiler enforces termination-insensitive noninterference and we provide an implementa-tion that illustrates its applicability.
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hal-01087374 , version 1 (25-11-2014)

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José Fragoso Santos, Tamara Rezk. An Information Flow Monitor-Inlining Compiler for Securing a Core of JavaScript. 29th IFIP International Information Security Conference (SEC), Jun 2014, Marrakesh, Morocco. pp.278-292, ⟨10.1007/978-3-642-55415-5_23⟩. ⟨hal-01087374⟩
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